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We explored how different socioeconomic and racial/
ethnic groups in the United States might fare in an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic on the basis of social factors that shape exposure, 
vulnerability to inﬂ  uenza virus, and timeliness and adequa-
cy of treatment. We discuss policies that might differentially 
affect social groups’ risk for illness or death. Our purpose is 
not to establish the precise magnitude of disparities likely 
to occur; rather, it is to call attention to avoidable disparities 
that can be expected in the absence of systematic attention 
to differential social risks in pandemic preparedness plans. 
Policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels should 
consider potential sources of socioeconomic and racial/
ethnic disparities during a pandemic and formulate speciﬁ  c 
plans to minimize these disparities.
T
he threat of pandemic inﬂ  uenza has generated concern 
among politicians, policy makers, healthcare profes-
sionals, and the general public. For the past several cen-
turies, major inﬂ  uenza pandemics have occurred every 10 
to 30 years (1); it is widely believed that a new pandemic 
is “inevitable” (2). The possibility of an imminent inﬂ  u-
enza pandemic has been heightened by the appearance and 
spread of avian inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1), which has a case-fa-
tality ratio of >50% (3). Although the assumption has been 
that avian inﬂ  uenza viruses could not directly infect hu-
mans, the transmission of inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) directly 
from chickens to humans in 1997 caused experts to recon-
sider that assumption (4). Genetic changes in inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus subtype H5N1 in 2003 resulted in a new strain of the 
virus, which spread to multiple countries in East and South-
east Asia (5), as well as Europe and Africa. Whether the 
avian inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) develops human pandemic 
potential, its spread from birds to humans and the severity 
of the resulting disease have heightened concerns about a 
possible future inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
Considerable ﬁ  nancial resources have been devoted to 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness planning at the federal 
and state levels (6,7); however, resources at state and lo-
cal levels may be inadequate to implement a robust pre-
paredness plan (8,9). Past experience with natural disasters 
and current socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities 
in healthcare in the United States (10,11) raise questions 
about the adequacy of plans to address the needs of dis-
advantaged populations. For example, in responding to 
Hurricane Katrina, planners apparently failed to consider 
that many low-income persons might lack private modes 
of transportation and would depend on institutional help 
for evacuation. Although the evacuation was successful 
overall (12), deaths, injuries, and illness occurred dispro-
portionately among low-income persons in New Orleans 
because of economic and logistic constraints on their abil-
ity to respond to government recommendations to leave the 
city. Low-income and disadvantaged persons often suffer 
disproportionately during natural disasters and epidemics, 
and historical evidence demonstrates that low-income per-
sons fared considerably worse than high-income persons 
during the 1918 pandemic in the United States (13).
In this article, we describe ways in which different 
socioeconomic and racial/ethnic groups might fare dif-
ferently in an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, on the basis of current 
knowledge of social factors that shape exposure and vul-
nerability to inﬂ  uenza virus and that inﬂ  uence the timeli-
ness and adequacy of treatment among those who become 
ill. We also discuss policy decisions, made either before or 
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during a pandemic, which might differentially affect risk 
for illness or death for those of low income and of speciﬁ  c 
racial/ethnic groups. Our purposes are to 1) call attention 
to potentially major and avoidable social disparities in suf-
fering and death during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic and 2) high-
light the importance of including in pandemic preparedness 
plans targeted strategies for minimizing or avoiding these 
social disparities. The following discussion is not meant 
to be exhaustive; rather, it is meant to provoke reﬂ  ection 
about how potential disparities in the effects of an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic might be reduced or eliminated through appro-
priate planning and implementation of clinical and public 
health activities.
Conceptual Framework
Using a conceptual framework adapted from Dider-
ichsen et al. (14), we systematically considered possible 
sources of disparities during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic by ex-
amining the following 3 levels at which underlying socio-
economic or racial/ethnic differences could lead to dispari-
ties in illness or death: 1) likelihood of being exposed to the 
inﬂ  uenza virus; 2) likelihood of contracting inﬂ  uenza dis-
ease, if exposed; and 3) likelihood of receiving timely and 
effective treatment after inﬂ  uenza disease has developed. 
To explore socioeconomic and racial/ethnic disparities at 
each level, we searched the literature for relevant ﬁ  ndings 
based on population-based national data (Figure, Table).
How Could Disparities Arise?
Differences in Exposure 
Regardless of which strain of inﬂ  uenza virus causes 
the next pandemic, it will be highly transmissible between 
humans. Transmission of inﬂ  uenza is primarily airborne, 
through aerosolized respiratory tract secretions expelled 
during coughing and sneezing, although transmission by 
direct and possibly indirect contact may occur. Transmis-
sion can be expected to occur in various settings, includ-
ing homes, healthcare facilities, schools, work sites, public 
transportation, and other settings at which people gather for 
social, commercial, or entertainment purposes. Higher ex-
posure risk among particular population groups as a result 
of factors such as crowding and occupation could contrib-
ute to health disparities among socioeconomic and racial/
ethnic groups during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
Crowding, an established risk factor for many infec-
tious diseases, can increase the likelihood of pathogen trans-
mission. In the United States, urban poverty and Hispanic 
and Asian ethnicity are correlated with domestic crowding; 
even at higher income levels, Hispanic and Asian house-
holds are relatively more crowded than white and African-
American households (15). In addition, in the United States, 
low-income persons, African Americans, and nonwhite 
Hispanics are more likely than persons in other groups to 
obtain regular medical care at emergency departments and 
publicly funded clinics (10), where airborne transmission 
of infectious agents has been documented. Because these 
locations typically do not segregate sick and well patients 
and are becoming increasingly crowded (16), patients wait-
ing for care in these settings are likely to have greater ex-
posure to inﬂ  uenza viruses and other respiratory pathogens. 
Another source of increased exposure to infected persons is 
public transportation, where persons from low-income and 
minority households account for 63% of users (17). 
Occupational factors are also likely to lead to differ-
ential exposure risk during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, particu-
larly in terms of adherence to strategies that aim to limit 
case-patient contact with others (18). Staying home may 
not be economically feasible for persons in lower wage 
occupations; these persons are less able to afford losing 
income as a result of missed work and often lack the job 
ﬂ  exibility that would permit them to work at home. In ad-
dition, their jobs may be necessary because they provide 
essential goods and services. For these reasons, parents in 
lower wage/lower status occupations may be more likely to 
keep their children in communal childcare settings—where 
exposure risks are relatively high—during an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic, placing everyone in the family at greater risk 
for exposure.
Differences in Susceptibility 
Among persons who have been exposed to inﬂ  uenza 
virus, the likelihood of contracting disease may be modi-
ﬁ  ed by underlying host factors and medical conditions, 
such as age, smoking status, nutritional status, stress levels, 
and cardiopulmonary disease. The inﬂ  uence that most host 
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Figure. Possible sources of disparities during a pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
outbreak.Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Planning and Health Disparities 
factors will have on the development of inﬂ  uenza during a 
future pandemic is uncertain; some evidence suggests that 
the factors affecting disease severity and death may dif-
fer from those typically observed during annual inﬂ  uenza 
epidemics (19). However, given overwhelming evidence 
that low-income persons are generally more susceptible to 
infectious diseases, it is reasonable to plan on the basis of 
well-documented annual epidemic patterns, in which inﬂ  u-
enza disease development is inﬂ  uenced by factors that are 
differentially distributed across socioeconomic and racial/
ethnic groups. These patterns, as well as patterns of many 
other diseases, indicate that socially disadvantaged groups 
are likely to be at higher risk for inﬂ  uenza disease, particu-
larly severe disease.
The inability to predict which inﬂ   uenza virus will 
cause a future pandemic, together with the very limited 
national and global capacity to produce inﬂ  uenza vaccine 
in massive quantities in a short time, almost ensures that 
an effective vaccine will be unavailable to most or all of 
the population during the early stages of a pandemic and 
in very short supply thereafter. Even so, current plans as-
sume that local and state public health agencies will have 
a primary role for distributing pandemic inﬂ  uenza vaccine. 
In general, however, these plans do not adequately address 
preventing or minimizing socioeconomic or racial/ethnic 
disparities in vaccine distribution and acceptance, despite 
evidence that such disparities have been the rule for the 
annual inﬂ  uenza vaccine, even among persons >65 years of 
age (20). In the United States, routine use of annual inﬂ  u-
enza vaccine in preschool children has only recently been 
introduced; information focusing on school-age children is 
limited (21). Nevertheless, African American/black chil-
dren and children from lower income families, who are at 
higher risk of contracting inﬂ  uenza (22) in this country, are 
less likely to be up to date with other routine immuniza-
tions (23). It is possible that, in the context of an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic, vaccine-seeking and acceptance behavior and 
resultant coverage patterns may differ from those observed 
during routine vaccination efforts; however, the weight of 
available evidence indicates that social disparities in vac-
cine coverage are likely to occur in the absence of careful 
planning to prevent them.
Differences in Treatment
Among those who contract inﬂ  uenza, subsequent ill-
ness and death may be inﬂ  uenced by underlying factors 
and conditions and by the timeliness and effectiveness of 
various treatment modalities. Most inﬂ  uenza illnesses are 
self-limiting, and most infected persons during both annual 
inﬂ  uenza epidemics and inﬂ  uenza pandemics (including 
that of 1918–19) recover with only supportive care in the 
community. Even so, current planning efforts recognize the 
potential importance of reducing disease during a pandem-
ic, through early treatment with antiviral drugs and through 
other forms of treatment such as respiratory support and an-
timicrobial agents to treat secondary bacterial pneumonia, 
among those with more severe disease.
In the United States, the likelihood of substantial dis-
parities in access to timely and appropriate care under in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemic conditions is high, given long-standing 
and persistent disparities in access to medical care. For ex-
ample, persons with low income are ≈2× as likely as those 
with higher incomes to lack a usual source of healthcare 
(24). Similarly, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic persons 
are signiﬁ  cantly less likely than non-Hispanic white persons 
to report having a usual primary care provider (10). Among 
persons who do report having a usual source of care, those 
who are poor or near poor and those who are non-Hispanic 
black or Hispanic are 2.5–4× as likely as their relatively 
higher income and white counterparts to rely on a hospital-
based source of primary care (24). These same groups are 
also more likely to report having difﬁ  culty obtaining timely 
appointments for illness or injury, which suggests problems 
with access to care even among those with a usual source of 
healthcare (10). Language and cultural barriers to seeking 
and receiving medical care also may contribute to dispari-
ties. In emergency departments, for example, interpreters 
are frequently unavailable or underused, which has poten-
tially adverse implications for patients’ understanding of 
their disease or treatment and for clinical decision making 
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Table. Factors that could contribute to health disparities among socioeconomic and racial/ethnic groups during an influenza pandemic
Differences in exposure to influenza virus 
  Crowding in households, medical facilities, public transportation 
  Occupational factors such as inability to work from home, dependence on childcare outside of the home 
Differences in susceptibility to influenza disease, once exposed to the virus 
  Host factors, including preexisting immunity, age, other underlying diseases or conditions, smoking, nutritional status, stress
  Vaccination status, reflecting differences in vaccine seeking and acceptance and in vaccine availability 
Differences in timely effective treatment, once influenza disease has developed 
  Access to outpatient and inpatient medical care 
    Care-seeking attitudes and behavior 
    Financial obstacles, including lack of adequate insurance coverage 
  Logistic  obstacles,  including  transportation,  language 
  Quality of care 
    Availability of antiviral treatments 
  Appropriate  inpatient  treatment PERSPECTIVE
and quality of care (25). In addition, the large numbers of 
persons who lack health insurance, as well as those who 
lack documentation of US citizenship, often delay seeking 
care because they are concerned about paying for the care 
or encountering legal difﬁ  culties.
Evidence from previous outbreaks suggests that anti-
viral drugs may be effective for treatment (26) and preven-
tion (27) of pandemic inﬂ  uenza, and current antiviral drugs 
seem to be biologically effective against 1918 and 1918-
like viruses (28). Because vaccine may not be available 
when a pandemic begins, experts have suggested that the 
antiviral drug oseltamivir should be stockpiled for use dur-
ing a pandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreak. Recent models suggest 
that early use of oseltamivir may contain outbreaks if cer-
tain criteria regarding transmissibility and compliance are 
met (29). However, experience with nonpandemic inﬂ  u-
enza indicates that oseltamivir must be given early during 
symptom development for it to have any substantial bio-
logical effect (30); modest delays may vitiate the treatment 
effectiveness (31). Although plans for release and distribu-
tion of antiviral drugs are still being ﬁ  nalized, overcoming 
long-standing disparities in access to timely treatment by 
socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, ability to speak Eng-
lish, and legal status will present numerous challenges to 
ensuring equal access to such drugs during a pandemic.
Reasons for concern about disparities in the timeliness 
and appropriateness of the care received by inﬂ  uenza pa-
tients who might beneﬁ  t from in-hospital care are similar. 
Given the predicted insufﬁ  cient supply of hospital beds and 
staff during a pandemic (32), a person’s access to poten-
tially lifesaving therapies such as respiratory support and 
antimicrobial treatment of secondary bacterial pneumonias 
in an inpatient setting is likely to depend on factors that 
include usual source of care, citizenship status, and ability 
to speak English. Disparities may also occur in the quality 
of care received by persons who are hospitalized. Earlier 
US studies of persons hospitalized for pneumonia have 
found that blacks and “other minorities” are 71% and 79% 
as likely, respectively, as non-Hispanic whites to receive 
antimicrobial agents within 8 hours of arrival at the hospi-
tal (33) and signiﬁ  cantly less likely to have blood cultures 
obtained before receiving antimicrobial therapy (10). Such 
disparities in quality of care would likely persist during an 
inﬂ  uenza pandemic.
Discussion
Although reducing or eliminating socioeconomic and 
racial/ethnic disparities in health and healthcare has been an 
ofﬁ  cial federal and state policy priority for 2 decades (34), 
such disparities remain prevalent and may inadvertently 
become wider when not explicitly addressed by policies 
designed to improve the health of the population as a whole 
and of disadvantaged persons in particular (35). Given the 
current limitations of our public health infrastructure and 
the disparities in healthcare, a pandemic inﬂ  uenza outbreak 
in the United States is likely to disproportionately affect 
persons from socially disadvantaged groups. Explicit, sys-
tematic, and detailed plans are essential for overcoming the 
social barriers that are predicted to result in socioeconomic 
and racial/ethnic disparities in pandemic inﬂ  uenza illness 
and death. Saunders and Monet also have called for pan-
demic inﬂ  uenza planning that appropriately considers the 
needs of disadvantaged populations (36).
The Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Plan of the US Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) (37) does not ad-
equately address potential social disparities in exposure, 
vaccination, or treatment; the possible effects of such dis-
parities; or strategies for minimizing or eliminating them. 
The HHS plan (37), the federal guidance on vaccine al-
location (38), and the recent Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for community-level 
mitigation strategies (18) should be credited for calling for 
community engagement and inclusion of a wide variety 
of stakeholders in planning at the local level. Outreach to 
providers, community leaders, and organizations, particu-
larly in disadvantaged communities, will be an important 
component of any strategy for addressing disparities dur-
ing a pandemic. However, the available versions of ofﬁ  cial 
plans do not call attention to the need for special efforts to 
overcome the greater barriers likely to be faced by socially 
disadvantaged groups.
On a US government website for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
(www.pandemicﬂ   u.gov), a question asks which groups 
would be especially vulnerable during an inﬂ  uenza pan-
demic. The answer notes that people may be vulnerable for 
a variety of reasons, including limited access to healthcare; 
limited proﬁ  ciency in English; or being disabled, home-
less, economically disadvantaged, or a single parent. The 
response calls for faith-based and community-based orga-
nizations to develop plans “to care for dependent popula-
tions” and to “provide ﬁ  nancial aid to the poor who are 
unable to work and are in need of emergency income for 
housing, medicine, or other essential needs” (www.pan-
demicﬂ  u.gov/faq/pandemicinﬂ  uenza/pi-0001.html), which 
implies that attention to the needs of economically or so-
cially vulnerable persons is not primarily a public-sector 
responsibility but is more a matter for private charity. The 
2005 HHS plan (37) itself acknowledges that some groups 
may need ﬁ  nancial assistance if they are unable to work but 
does not indicate how that assistance would be provided or 
who would provide it. 
Those who are still formulating plans should consider 
likely differences in inﬂ  uenza exposure and identify poten-
tial strategies for mitigating such disparities. Mathematical 
models have demonstrated that community-based inter-
ventions, such as quarantine and individual isolation, may 
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be important for reducing inﬂ  uenza attack rates and over-
all incidence (29). Most pandemic plans call for limiting 
public gatherings and closing schools to slow the spread of 
inﬂ  uenza, without adequately taking into account how im-
plementing these strategies could differentially affect dis-
advantaged groups. Recent recommendations from CDC 
go further in recognizing the differential effect of social-
distancing measures on vulnerable communities (18). Al-
though CDC advocates ﬂ  exible work arrangements, income 
replacement, and job security to minimize the negative ef-
fects of social-distancing measures, it pays inadequate at-
tention to those whose jobs will not accommodate these 
interventions. More speciﬁ  c solutions should be outlined in 
pandemic preparedness plans to address the economic ef-
fects of quarantine on low-income persons, who by staying 
home may be at risk wage loss, job termination, or both. 
Job security and income replacement are key components 
to limiting the effects of potential quarantine measures on 
disadvantaged persons (39) and should be extended to all 
persons, regardless of their type of work.
Important decisions also will need to be made con-
cerning access to vaccination and treatment in the event 
of a pandemic. The federal government’s Draft Guidance 
on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza Vaccine 
(38) provides a basic framework for allocating vaccine dur-
ing the pandemic. An appendix to that document mentions 
(on p.17) that the principles of “fairness and equity (rec-
ognizing that all persons have equal value, and providing 
equal opportunity for vaccination among all persons in a 
priority group)” were considered when drafting the guide-
lines. Although the proposed schema very reasonably ﬁ  rst 
deﬁ  nes groups of different priority levels according to oc-
cupation and then, within the general population, according 
to age and pregnancy status, it does not provide explicit 
attention to groups who are vulnerable because of social 
disadvantage. Nor does it note the need for explicit atten-
tion to vulnerable social subgroups, for example, low-wage 
workers in prioritized occupational ﬁ  elds and low-income 
and minority pregnant women, infants, and toddlers. We 
are not questioning the rationality of deﬁ  ning major prior-
ity groups according to occupation or of using biological 
criteria to further prioritize within the general population. 
Rather, our concern is with the absence of attention to both 
biological and social risk factors, which must be addressed 
to overcome the many social barriers to equal opportunity 
for vaccination.
Well-documented evidence of existing healthcare dis-
parities suggests that during a pandemic shortages of inﬂ  u-
enza vaccine, antiviral drugs, inpatient services, and health-
care staff will disproportionately affect persons in socially 
disadvantaged groups. To limit the crowds that might occur 
at hospitals and clinics, plans for the release of stockpiles 
of vaccines, medications, or both could include distribu-
tion from private pharmacies or doctors’ ofﬁ  ces. However, 
because private pharmacies and private practitioners are 
less likely to be located in lower income neighborhoods, 
plans to make access to potentially lifesaving vaccines and 
drugs speedier and more equitable might, in fact, exacer-
bate disparities. Distribution plans may need to include mo-
bile community health centers (staffed by nurses and nurse 
practitioners) that can travel to low-income areas, along 
with a variety of community medical and other service pro-
viders and nontraditional sites like soup kitchens, sheltered 
workshops, and transit points, which have become popu-
lar places for administering yearly inﬂ  uenza vaccine (40). 
Other factors, such as the availability of transportation to a 
hospital, might also become more important during a pan-
demic. Access to a private car may be a major determinant 
of who is able to obtain care, presenting constraints like 
those that led to disparities in evacuation from New Or-
leans before Hurricane Katrina. To ensure that disadvan-
taged communities are reached and that resources are equi-
tably allocated during an inﬂ  uenza pandemic, preparedness 
plans can and should involve community-based providers 
and organizations that are familiar with vulnerable groups.
Conclusions
Social group disparities in exposure, susceptibility, 
and access to timely and effective treatment for a variety of 
diseases have been well documented in the United States. 
Inﬂ  uenza pandemic preparedness plans that fail to explicit-
ly provide guidelines on how to mitigate these issues could 
lead to decisions that may, on the surface, seem reasonable, 
but that are likely to exacerbate social group disparities 
in health outcomes. Given the existence of major dispari-
ties in health and healthcare, we cannot expect pandemic 
preparedness and response planning to eliminate the deep 
divides that exist between socioeconomic and racial/eth-
nic groups. These disparities can, however, be minimized 
through careful planning that considers and proactively 
addresses vulnerability at each level: exposure to disease, 
susceptibility to disease if exposed, and treatment of dis-
ease. Public ofﬁ  cials should systematically consider the ad-
ditional barriers faced by socially disadvantaged groups at 
each of these levels and then actively seek ways to address 
those barriers. Local service providers, leaders of commu-
nity-based organizations and other organizations working 
with socially vulnerable groups, and leaders of labor unions 
representing low-wage service workers are likely to have 
valuable insights and should be included in the planning 
process. Plans calling for stakeholder involvement without 
explicitly emphasizing the need to involve representatives 
of socially disadvantaged groups are unlikely to be effec-
tive at minimizing social disparities during an inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic.
We have focused here on the United States, but similar 
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fundamental principles—the need for systematic and con-
crete planning to minimize the social disparities that can 
be expected to occur in the face of natural disasters such as 
an inﬂ  uenza pandemic—apply worldwide. Countries with 
universal ﬁ  nancial access to healthcare and strong social 
safety nets will be best positioned to minimize such dispari-
ties. Countries in which large proportions of the population 
are impoverished or otherwise socially excluded and coun-
tries that have more limited resources and weaker public 
health and social welfare infrastructures will face the great-
est challenges. The framework used here—considering and 
proactively addressing social vulnerability in exposure to 
pathogens, susceptibility to disease once exposed, and con-
sequences of illness—should be applicable across national 
and subnational settings.
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